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Abstract 
In this introductory article to our special issue on newsmaking in Russia, we provide a context 
for how the study of journalism evolved in Russia in contrast to Europe and the US. This brief 
historical overview helps make sense of the specific trajectory of journalism studies: from 
normative Cold War perspectives to a highly diverse and vibrant field that considers 
journalistic agency, the interplay of commercialisation and media control and the complexities 
of a rapidly changing media environment. The contributions to this special issue present 
nuanced approaches to self-censorship, the impact of digital technologies and political 
intervention. 
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Introduction 
Despite an ever intense fascination in the West with ‘peculiar’ Russia, journalism study 
scholars have never taken any great interest in the specificities of newsmaking in the 
country. Scholars have traditionally seen Russian journalism as a spawn of the Kremlin’s 
power, and therefore hardly paid any attention to what is going on in the newsrooms and 
how technological and political developments of the regime affect journalists’ daily work. 
This special issue is a first step to make up for this neglect. The focus is on newsrooms in 
Moscow as well as across the whole country. It looks at the impact of new government 
legislation, the daily processes of news production and the handling of major international 
news stories. 
Russian newsmaking: A historical overview 
The label of uniqueness with regards to Russia and its history is usually badly overused and 
often carelessly applied. It does have a case in point with regards to journalism and news-
making, however. Journalism in Russia evolved on a different trajectory than in the West. 
The history of journalism in Russia was an integral part of the country’s Westernisation since 
the 18th century. Peter the Great, Russia’s legendary reformer-tsar, brought the idea of a 
regular newspaper from his European trips. On his orders, Russia’s first newspaper, St. 
Petersburg News [Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti], appeared in 1702. Catherine the Great in 
1769 established a journal that called for moderate satire [Vsiakaia vsiachina]. Other 
members of the elite cautiously critiqued the autocracy, such as one of the country’s leading 
Enlightenment era philosophers, the publisher Nikolai Novikov, who established several 
satirical journals. 
In contrast to the establishment of an increasingly independent press in Britain, France, 
Germany and the United States, in Russia autocratic censorship made the decade’s best 
writers seek to express their ideas through literature criticism rather than printed 
journalism (see Brooks, 1985; McReynolds, 1991). An expression of this trend was a number 
of journals, the most prominent of which was Sovremennik [The Contemporary]. It was set 
up by the poet Alexander Pushkin in 1836, who modelled it along the Edinburgh Review, a 
liberally-minded cultural magazine. Leo Tolstoy’s writing career took its beginnings with 
publications in this journal. During his editorship from the 1850s onwards, Nikolai 
Chernyshevsky, later a prominent literary critic, Sovremennik became a major voice for 
liberal reform. By that time, the voices of liberal intelligentsia were no longer to be 
suppressed, and the autocratic attempts to undermine the emergence of journalism 
channelled the generation’s energy and spirit into the production of some of the best works 
in world literature (see McReynolds, 1990). 
The February revolution of 1917 that cancelled state censorship opened briefly the 
floodgates to a sea of new publications. When the Bolsheviks took power in October that 
year, they severely pushed back on freedom of speech, while at the same time worshipping 
the power of mass communication. In fact, the party newspaper [Iskra] had been the main 
instrument around which activities were organised prior to the revolution, whilst Lenin,  the 
leader of the Bolshevik Party, back in 1905 stressed the importance of journalism for the 
socialist state. Shortly after the Revolution, Pravda had replaced Iskra as the main party 
organ. Many Bolsheviks were writers and reporters and enthusiastically joined in the state’s 
propaganda efforts (Kenez, 1985). The state actively invested into technologies and rapidly 
developed the radio and film industry to ‘reach the masses’ (Lovell, 2015). The artefacts they 
produced, especially posters and short films, have fascinated scholars ever since (Berkhoff, 
2012; Cook, 2007). 
By the time of Stalin’s rule in the 1930s, public life was fully in the grip of tyranny. Even 
in those dark years, journalists retained some, albeit most minor, level of autonomy in their 
daily work, at least the most trusted among them (see, e.g. Balmford, 2015). After Stalin’s 
death and throughout the late Soviet Union, journalists maintained a strong sense of being 
in service of the people; to act as a public watchdog, be sensitive to readers’ concerns and, if 
necessary, remind the state of its obligations to look after its people (Wolfe, 2005). There 
were even cases of journalists undertaking investigative research, which led to the revelation 
of corruption and arbitrary behaviour among local bureaucrats (Roudakova, 2017, pp. 51–
97). 
This did little to prevent Soviet citizens to be tired out by the repetitiveness and emptiness 
of most media products, which they deeply distrusted. They either read between the lines or 
simply disappeared into a world of (science) fiction, historical novels and literary magazines 
that created a parallel reality of the late Soviet man. Everyone was convinced that this would 
last forever (Yurchak, 2006) and nobody expected that Mikhail Gorbachev’s glasnost in 1987 
would set off the freest period in Russian news-making to date (Turkova, 2017). 
Boldly ignoring the official party line and proactively reporting on previously 
unmentionable issues, such as human rights offenses, corruption in the highest ranks of 
power, unemployment, alcoholism, ethnic hatred or police brutality, they became icons of 
change and were trusted more than any party member. Popular television programmes (such 
as The View or Vzgliad, launched in 1987) were broadcasted at prime time. Talk show hosts 
and their investigative reporters became superstars; their public appearances filled whole 
football stadiums (Kinopoisk, 2020). The rapid and radical reforms and developments of 
these years changed the country beyond recognition. In June 1991, even before the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union in December of that year, censorship was banned. Russia’s 
first post-Soviet constitution, passed in 1993, enshrined freedom of speech as a core 
constitutional law. 
There was a powerful sense of optimism, drive and vision for the new Russia: journalists 
wanted to do things better. However, by the mid-1990s, their enthusiasm receded: nascent, 
independent media outlets were being taken over by the newly risen media tycoons. Next 
followed the rapid oligarchisation of the media landscape as well as an unprecedented media 
campaign in 1996 to get Boris Yeltsin’s popularity lifted from the ground. The country’s 
powerful oligarchs pulled their forces to see him win over his main contender, the highly 
popular Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, who they feared would destroy private 
business. The campaign was joined by the country’s most respected new journalists, who had 
spearheaded the liberal-democratic reforms but now readily applied the smearing 
techniques they knew from Soviet times: kompromat, character assassination and right-out 
lies (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017a). Without this oligarchy-financed media intervention, 
Yeltsin would have stood no chance to be re-elected for a second term. He rewarded the 
oligarchs who supported him with lucrative media assets. Some, among them the late 
oligarch Boris Berezovsky, were left empty-handed. They retaliated with yet another media 
campaign hoping to force the government to change their mind (Fossato and Kachkaeva, 
1997; Mickiewicz, 1999; Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017a; Zassoursky, 2004). 
After Putin’s election as president in March 2000, he cemented his position by publicly 
attacking some of the most powerful 1990s oligarchs. His first targets were those among 
them who possessed large media empires (Ostrovsky, 2015). The Putin Administration was 
determined to bring them under their control. They started ever-increasing construing 
hurdles and restrictions for them. Eventually almost all free and independent media were 
shut down. As a result, the employment market for quality journalism has dramatically 
shrunk. 
The study of contemporary Russian journalism and 
newsmaking 
The 1956 publication of Four Theories of the Press by the political scientists Fred Siebert, 
Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm set a template of how to conceptualise Soviet 
media: complete state control over the press and its instrumental use for Communist Party 
objectives. This normative reading echoed in many subsequent works, most in Comparing 
Media Systems by Hallin and Mancini (2004). In later works, Hallin and Mancini (2012), 
when including the Russian media system into their analysis, they had parted with many 
normative elements they held onto in earlier writings. In general, however, normative 
approaches have distracted media scholars for decades from discovering the complexities 
embedded in the Soviet and Russian media system. 
Scholarly interest in practices of journalism in the West go back to the early twentieth 
century. According to Belair-Gagnon and Revers (2018), the sociology of journalism takes its 
European beginning with Max Weber, who pushed for public opinion and media studies. 
Around the same time, in the US, the Chicago School of Sociology carried out their first 
urban ethnography on immigrants’ foreign language press. After the war, many sociologists 
of journalism were integrated into media communication departments, as a result of which 
the sociology of journalism developed in a slightly different trajectory than  sociology overall. 
On both sides of the Atlantic many newsroom ethnographers were recruited from former 
and still acting journalists.1 By the late 1970s (strongly influenced by Gaye Tuchman), media 
scholars had embraced the idea that news are socially constructed and objectivity is a 
ritualistic performance. 
Meanwhile, humanities and social science scholars who worked on twentieth-century 
Russia came to be dominated by Sovietologists. Their primary interest was in political-
science analyses of the totalitarian system (see Engerman, 2009). The language they spoke 
was very different to the one used by newsroom ethnographers in the West. Western media 
scholars, in turn, used concepts and frameworks which were not applicable to the study of 
Soviet journalism. 
Sovietologists made no effort to challenge this generalising view. In any case, they were 
sealed off from Soviet newsrooms and could not possibly dream about carrying out any 
ethnographic studies. When Western scholars were allowed into the country, the best they 
could hope for was to receive access to strictly-controlled and pre-selected archival materials 
(Remington, 1985). They were left to reading in between the lines of Pravda and Izvestia 
(Axelrod and Zimmermann, 1981). There was value in this; the Soviet Union’s political elites 
did the very same (Rogers, 1970, 1971). 
When journalism got energised in the late 1980s, it developed so rapidly that Western-
based Sovietologists could not keep pace. Some nevertheless tried and did so successfully: 
Mickiewicz (1988) and McNair (1991) traced the tectonic changes in glasnost media in 
general and television in particular. In the early 1990s, David Edgwood Benn, a Cold War 
veteran of British broadcasting, travelled to Russia to interview journalists and editors about 
how they experienced the transition from the Soviet to post-Soviet media conditions of work 
(1996). 
At the turn of the century there was a major change in studying journalist practices across 
the globe and scholars started to pay more attention to non-American, non-European 
contexts (see, e.g. Curran and Park, 2000; De Beer and Merrill, 2004; Hallin and Mancini, 
2012; Murphy and Rodriguez, 2006; Löffelholz and Weaver, 2008). This trend brought 
Russia back onto the radar. Scholars were mostly interested in the newly rising state control 
and censorship in the 2000s (see, e.g. Becker, 2004; Castells, 2009; Vartanova, 2012). A 
great example of this is Sarah Oates’ ‘neo-Soviet media model’ (Oates, 2007): the Kremlin 
exerts censorship, oppresses opposition media and facilitates loyal coverage of Kremlin 
policies. Some have criticised this model for not considering nuances that show that Russia’s 
media system today in many respects differs from that in the Soviet Union and its methods 
of control (e.g. Tolz and Teper, 2018). 
By the late 2000s Russian journalism studies had caught up, greatly thanks to emigrant 
scholars from Russia and the Soviet Union, many of whom had worked in journalism at 
some point. They drew upon their experience and relied on scholarly concepts to combine 
theories and practice (Lipman, 2005; Lipman and McFaul, 2001). The former radio 
journalist Svetlana Pasti realised the importance of generations in Russia’s young 
journalistic community and their potential to raise tensions and conflicts (2005). 
Adjustment to new and ever changing environments was also the focus of a study by 
Olesya Koltsova (2006). Beyond this question, Koltsova examined how the St Petersburg-
based journalists in her study negotiated their various attitudes towards professional ethics 
and organised their daily interaction with colleagues and newsmakers (see also Chupin and 
Dauce, 2017). 
Exploring the concepts of media ecology in a tradition of McLuhan (1964) and Postman 
(1970), Hoskins and Shchelin (2018) traced how the Panama Papers investigation was 
covered in Russian media, both state-controlled and independent online media. In a similar 
vein, but under opposite signs, Vera Tolz, Stephen Hutchings, Precious Chatterje-Doody and 
Rhys Crilley in this special issue looked at another controversial story of the recent years, 
namely the scandal unleashed by the Skripal poisoning. Their analysis of RT journalists 
demonstrated that modern authoritarian states struggle to micromanage their journalists, 
which forces them to increase the agency to allocate to them. Entrusted with this difficult 
task, these journalists had to balance doing justice and not neglecting their outlets’ 
commercial and political interests by losing credibility among their audience. The 
combination of such factors led to the car crash interview of the RT boss Margarita 
Simonyan with the Novichok suspects Petrov and Bashirov, which made waves around the 
world (Higgins, 2018) 
Following Western research shifts from organisational structures to journalistic agency 
(see Belair-Gagnon and Revers, 2018), the youngest generation of scholars on Russian 
journalism pursued a similar interest. Most important here is the work by Roudakova 
(2008, 2009, 2017). With her 2017 award-winning book Losing Pravda, she brought 
Russian newsroom ethnography onto a new level. Her work marks the start of yet a new 
generation of young scholars investigating post-Soviet journalism. Examples are Zeveleva 
(2018, 2020), Malyutina (2019) and Fedirko (2020), who illustrate on the cases of Ukraine, 
Russia and Crimea how journalists adapt to changing regimes and new restrictions in their 
freedom of speech. 
Self-censorship and commercialisation 
Self-censorship in Russia and the commercialisation of the media market are closely 
connected. Unlike widely assumed, we claim that marketisation and aggressive state 
interference are no opposites and that censorship is not generated either through state 
repression or through commercial demands. In fact, both these demands have long merged 
(Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2020). According to the biggest ever study on self-censorship in 
Russian journalism carried out by Svetlana Bodrunova, Anna Litvinenko and Kamilla 
Nigmatullina, commercial pressures and editorial interests are, however, negligible if 
compared to political factors. This is the same for offline and online journalism, as their 
survey of 95 journalists from 51 Russian regions suggests. In this study, they asked what 
makes journalists censor themselves in their daily work. The study shows the paradox ways 
of how journalists justify for themselves why self-censorship is something positive: it 
protects their sources, helps avoiding conflicts and minimises personal risks. Important here 
is that Bodrunova et al locate the burden and pressure of such self-limitation acts primarily 
on the personal level. These important observations of the ‘censor’ in the daily journalistic 
work is very much in line with our concept of adekvatnost, a term we coined back in 2013. 
Adekvatnost implies a set of strategies – almost a sixth sense – that helps journalist 
navigate the newsroom and find a way around the constraining side-effects of censorship 
and self-censorship (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2014, 2017a, 2017b, 2020). Adekvatnost is 
essential for efficient news production; what topic to prioritise, how to approach them, what 
guests to invite and so on. It relieves journalists from constant doubts about whether they 
are in line with what is expected from them. It also allows them to be creative and 
innovative. This is key to give programmes and news the entertaining and engaging elements 
they require. Media managers follow similar strategies when implementing Kremlin policies: 
we have noted that in our qualitative interviews with Russia’s leading editors-in-chief 
(Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2017a), which complements big data collected by Rolf Freidheim 
(2016) of the influence of editors-in-chief on the news agenda of Russia’s major news 
websites. 
We argue that informal practices of this kind emerge in contexts of oligarch-dominated 
ownership structures paired with rising authoritarianism (Schimpfössl and Yablokov, 2020; 
for a similar phenomenon outside Russia, see Lee and Chan, 2009: 124; and Tapsell 2012: 
229, 240). Bodrunova et al.’s study explain that these circumstances – that journalists are 
forced taking simple ethical decisions individually on a daily basis – are down to the fact that 
professional standards are still only in the making. To be fair, Russian journalists did make 
efforts to introduce a code of ethics, as we demonstrate elsewhere (2017a), first in 1994. They 
traded ethical principles for financial benefits, which set the standards for subsequent 
generations. In his contribution to this special issue, Alexei Kovalev offers numerous witness 
testimonies of how both senior management and political authorities exert pressure. 
News aggregators and digitalisation 
Amidst the growing role of the state in the Russian media market, digital space has been one 
of the safe havens for independent journalists and quality news media platforms (Zavadski 
and Toepfl, 2018). Seemingly based on pure technical algorithms, news aggregator services 
have started to partake in processes that result in the drowning of non-government-
sympathetic coverage. This has now even hit Yandex, Russia’s leading search engine which 
beats Google on the Russian market. For long, Yandex was adamant to keep its algorithm 
shielded from human invasion. This ensured many Russians a relatively wide range of 
information sources thanks to the top news aggregated by Yandex. 
There are both commercial and legal reasons for why Yandex eventually got caught up. 
First, as Kovalev argues in this issue, journalists are under constant pressure to sustain high 
traffic on their website, for which they are forced to produce a large number of clickbait 
pieces to trick the algorithm and push certain topics into the top of the news. Second, as 
Marielle Mijermars explores in her article, a recent law which holds news aggregators libel 
for spreading fake news forced Yandex to amend its algorithm in a way that favoured 
Kremlin-loyal news headlines. Both pieces tackle an important change in the operations of 
Russia’s newsrooms: Russian internet governance fundamentally changed journalists’ 
approach to news production. They had to adapt their titles, approaches to news stories and 
distribution methods on social media according to the new Yandex algorithms. 
As documented by Kovalev, when recording Yandex news during a recent anti-
government protest in Moscow, the capital is catching up with the rest of Russia when it 
comes to tight media control. Regional governors and mayors have for years exerted a far 
higher level of pressure and control on their local media. They have put most of the local 
media under their legal or financial control that created comfortable yet creatively limited 
zones for journalists. Olga Dovbysh’ contribution shows that traditional local media (e.g. 
print newspapers and television channels) highly dependent on the funding provided by city 
council and regional administrations which is an obstacle for their modernisation and, 
inadvertently, creates a niche for alternative voices provided by new media. 
*** 
Almost in a way confirming widespread stereotypes about how Russia works, its 
newsmaking ticks indeed very specifically and not like anywhere in the West. One reason for 
this is that it developed under strictest control from above – and in constant attempts to 
circumvent the straightjacket the state imposed on it. It was exactly this mixture that 
generated alternative forms of literary expression. When in the late twentieth century, 
during Perestroika of the 1980s, newsmaking was finally freed from constraints, it started 
thriving with a fervour and in forms that were, yet again, distinct. That period was short-
lived. It was not authoritarian control mechanisms that kicked in first. Prior to that, market 
logics and oligarchic interests took hold. This chain of development is crucial: rather than 
the state of newsmaking in Russia being predominantly a remnant of the Soviet rule, it is just 
as much a product of the 1990s oligarch capture and the economic crisis of 1998, followed by 
new forms of twenty-first-century digital authoritarianism and post-truth populism. This is 
why we argue that journalism studies in the West are well advised not to prematurely 
dismiss Russia, but pay closest attention. Russian newsmaking might well provide clues to 
the turbulences in the profession caused by misinformation, fake news and economic 
pressure. 
Note 
1.In the 1950s, the former journalist Warren Breed pointed to the impact a culture of 
individual aspirations had on the erosion of a sense of group allegiance. In the 1970s studies 
by scholars and journalists such as Herbert Gans, Philip Schlesinger, Peter Golding and 
Jeremy Tunstall, examined how routines and daily newsroom requirements influenced 
journalists’ more general norms and values. 
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